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Introduction 
After logging onto Facebook, you see that your friend has posted a 
video on your wall titled: “Donald Trump Pee Tape Released.” 
Surprised, you click on the link and are directed to a YouTube video of 
several young, scantily clad Russian women bouncing on a bed in what 
appears to be the infamous Presidential Suite at the Ritz Carlton in 
Moscow.1 Donald Trump walks into the room and heads towards the 
 
1. President Obama reportedly stayed in the Presidential Suite of the Ritz 
Carlton in Moscow during a diplomatic trip to Russia. Michelle Goldberg, 
Lordy, Is There a Tape?, N.Y. Times (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www. 
 nytimes.com/2018/04/16/opinion/comey-book-steele-dossier.html [https:// 
 perma.cc/FB5T-GGWF]. Later, Donald Trump was alleged to have 
stayed in the same room and hired Russian prostitutes to pee on the same 
bed where President Obama slept. Id.  
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women. You hear Trump’s voice say, “let’s have some fun, ladies.” The 
girls laugh and you hear Trump again: “How about we show Obama 
what we think of him. Why don’t you pee on his bed?” The tape cuts 
off in an instant and you feel shocked. Could this video actually be real? 
The video in the hypothetical above could easily be what is 
described colloquially as a “deepfake.” The definition of a deepfake is 
“still in flux, as technology develops.”2 However, a deepfake is generally 
understood to be a video made with the use of machine-learning to swap 
one real person’s face onto another real person’s face. This ability 
essentially makes it possible to ascribe the conduct of one individual 
who has been previously videotaped to a different individual.3 That is, 
a deepfake is a digital impersonation of someone. This impersonation 
occurs without the consent of either the person in the original video or 
the person whose face is superimposed on the original. Individuals in 
the public eye have already been a major target for deepfakes.4 Political 
figures likely will be the targets of future deepfakes, especially by those 
with an interest in spreading discord and undermining public trust.5 
Deepfakes of political figures pose serious challenges for our political 
system and even national security, but legal remedies for these videos 
are complicated. Every legal remedy to combat the negative effects of 
political deepfakes must go through a careful balancing test. On one 
side you have a special interest in protecting high-value political speech 
and furthering public discourse under the First Amendment. On the 
other side you have the potential for severe public harm by undermining 
elections and eroding trust in public officials. Although some political 
deepfakes might be satirical and promote public discourse about the 
 
2. James Vincent, Why We Need a Better Definition of ‘Deepfake’, The 
Verge (May 22, 2018, 2:53 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/22/ 
 17380306/deepfake-definition-ai-manipulation-fake-news [https://perma.cc/ 
 55JA-SH67]. 
3. Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming 
Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 Calif. L. 
Rev. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 4–5). 
4. Samantha Cole, AI-Assisted Fake Porn Is Here and We’re All Fucked, 
Vice: Motherboard (Dec. 11, 2017, 2:18 PM), https://motherboard.vice 
 .com/en_us/article/gydydm/gal-gadot-fake-ai-porn [https://perma.cc/ 
 4PQW-KCVE]. 
5. James Vincent, US Lawmakers Say AI Deepfakes ‘Have the Potential to 
Disrupt Every Facet of Our Society’, The Verge (Sept. 14, 2018, 1:17 
PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/14/17859188/ai-deepfakes-national-
security-threat-lawmakers-letter-intelligence-community [https://perma.cc/ 
 WE3U-BCLN]; Ana Romano, Jordan Peele’s Simulated Obama PSA Is a 
Double-Edged Warning Against Fake News, Vox (Apr. 18, 2018, 3:00 
PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/18/17252410/jordan-peele-obama-
deepfake-buzzfeed [https://perma.cc/3B9H-SX4X]. 
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merits of an individual candidate or issue,6 many deepfakes will likely 
cross over the line into pure defamation. 
Given this careful balancing test, what remedies are available for 
defamatory political deepfakes that survive First Amendment scrutiny? 
If deepfakes are found to be truly defamatory, such speech would only 
receive limited First Amendment protection and victims could recoup 
monetary damages from successful defamation lawsuits. 7  For most 
political figures, however, damages will be difficult, if not impossible, 
to determine, and any monetary damages will come too late to truly 
remedy the reputational harm inflicted during a campaign or their 
tenure as a public figure. Thus, injunctions are likely a quicker and 
more effective remedy for defamatory political deepfakes. 
Although injunctions against deepfakes may seem like a logical 
remedy, they will likely face major First Amendment hurdles. The 
Supreme Court has yet to provide a definitive answer on whether 
injunctions against defamatory speech are permissible under the First 
Amendment. 8  Some lower courts have found injunctions to be 
impermissible because they are not sufficiently tailored, effectively 
creating a prior restraint on constitutionally protected speech.9 Other 
courts have suggested that narrowly crafted injunctions against 
defamatory speech may be permissible.10 Even if an injunction against 
a defamatory political deepfake survives a First Amendment challenge, 
victims might still be unable to remove that deepfake if its creator is 
unreachable by United States courts.11 
This Note argues that narrowly crafted injunctions against 
defamatory political deepfakes should be permitted under the First 
 
6. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988) (“Despite 
their sometimes caustic nature . . . graphic depictions and satirical cartoons 
have played a prominent role in public and political debate.”). 
7. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (“The 
freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of 
speech, including defamation.”). 
8. See Tony v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734 (2005) (discussing but not resolving 
the permissibility of an injunction against defamatory speech). 
9. See Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 34 (1st Cir. 2018); McCarthy v. 
Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 461–62 (7th Cir. 2015); see also infra Part V. 
10. See San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125 
F.3d 1230, 1238 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding an injunction against 
fraudulent speech); Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d 38, 51 (5th Cir. 
1992) (permitting a limited injunction against defamatory speech); 
Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1208 (6th Cir. 1990) (Wellford, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (permitting a limited 
injunction against defamatory speech); David S. Ardia, Freedom of 
Speech, Defamation, and Injunctions, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 41 (2013). 
11. Chesney & Citron, supra note 3, at 44–45. 
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Amendment. First, this Note gives an overview of deepfakes and the 
technology used to propagate them. Then, it addresses the potential 
defamatory and non-defamatory uses of political deepfakes and how 
defamatory political deepfakes would be analyzed under the First 
Amendment’s heightened scrutiny standard that is used to analyze 
political speech. Third, it gives an overview of injunctions on speech 
under First Amendment jurisprudence and provides some examples of 
permissible injunctions on expression. Fourth, borrowing from obscen–
ity and copyright law, this Note discusses injunctions as a remedy for 
defamatory political deepfakes and whether such injunctions should be 
considered impermissible prior restraints on speech. Finally, it addresses 
the issue of unreachable defendants and provides a potential solution 
by extending to deepfakes the requirements for copyrighted materials 
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.12 
I. What Are Deepfakes? 
The notion of what a deepfake is might seem intuitive at first 
glance—deepfakes seem to be a simple fake or face-swapping video. But 
such a simple definition grossly oversimplifies the technology behind 
deepfakes and lacks the specificity needed to properly address deepfakes 
from a legal perspective. 
A. The Technology Behind Deepfakes 
Traditionally, any individual who wanted to edit a photo or video 
would have to upload the photo or video into a computer program and 
manually make any desired edits. Computer programs have gradually 
made the editing process easier, but a complete manual overhaul of a 
video with realistic final results is still very time- and resource-
intensive.13 For instance, when the creators of Rogue One: A Star Wars 
Story decided to bring back the character of Grand Moff Tarkin through 
a digital recreation, the Rogue One visual-effects supervisor described 
the digital recreation process as “extremely labor-intensive and 
expensive.”14 
 
12. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012). 
13. Donie O’Sullivan, Deepfake Videos: Inside the Pentagon’s Race Against 
Disinformation, CNN (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/ 
 2019/01/business/pentagons-race-against-deepfakes/ [https://perma.cc/ 
 PQ2H-PK59]; Scott Ross, Why VFX House Lose Money on Big Movies, 
The Hollywood Reporter (Mar. 7, 2013, 5:00 AM), https://www 
 .hollywoodreporter.com/news/why-life-pi-titanic-vfx-426182 [https://perma 
 .cc/Z8KF-X2HZ]. 
14. Grand Moff Tarkin was originally played by the late Peter Cushing but 
Cushing died prior to the filming of Rogue One: A Star Wars Story. Dave 
Itzkoff, How ‘Rogue One’ Brought Back Familiar Faces, N.Y. Times 
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Deepfakes, however, do not require human labor to manually 
manipulate videos; instead, a computer’s processing power does all the 
work.15 The technology that makes deepfakes possible stems from “a 
branch of Machine Learning that focuses on deep neural networks” 
called “deep learning.”16 Deep learning loosely imitates the way the 
brain works by processing information through a series of nodes (similar 
to neurons) in an artificial neural network. For a neural network to 
replicate an image, it must take in a multitude of information from a 
particular source (often called an “input layer”) and then run that 
information through various nodes until it produces an “output layer.”17 
Neural networks are “trained” by adjusting the weights at each node 
to try to improve the final “output layer” to be as close as possible to 
the desired result.18 
 Deepfakes add an extra layer of complexity onto this process 
because they ultimately have two input sources: (1) the face in the 
original scenario video (“original face”), and (2) the face swapped into 
the original scenario video (“swapped face”). To facilitate this process, 
a computer must generate two separate neural networks for each image, 
each that has enough in common with the other to be able to swap 
images on a shared facial structure.19 A basic way to achieve this result 
is through an autoencoder.20 An autoencoder is a “neural network that 
is trained to attempt to copy its input to its output.”21 In order for the 
face swapping to be successful, the computer must construct two 
separate neural networks, one for the original face and another for the 
swapped face, and both must be trained separately. 22  Once the 
individual networks have been built with enough accuracy through 
training, then a portion of the networks called the decoders can be 
swapped, effectively pasting the swapped face onto the network of the 
 
(Dec. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/27/movies/how-rogue-
one-brought-back-grand-moff-tarkin.html [https://perma.cc/F9B7-8K62]. 
15. O’Sullivan, supra note 13. 
16. Alan Zucconi, An Introduction to Neural Networks and Autoencoders, 
Alan Zucconi Blog (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.alanzucconi.com/2018/ 
 03/14/an-introduction-to-autoencoders/ [https://perma.cc/HJ6F-MJXS]. 
17. Id. (explaining that image-based applications are often built on 
convolutional neural networks). 
18. Id. 
19. Alan Zucconi, Understanding the Technology Behind DeepFakes, Alan 
Zucconi Blog (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.alanzucconi.com/2018/ 
 03/14/understanding-the-technology-behind-deepfakes/ [https://perma.cc/ 
 L7UE-2WWF].  
20. Zucconi, supra note 16. 
21. Ian Goodfellow et al., Deep Learning 499 (2016) (ebook). 
22. Zucconi, supra note 19. 
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original face. Using such technology allows the swapped face to mimic 




Face generation can be made even more realistic through the use of 
a Generative Adversarial Network (“GAN”).25 Similar to autoencoding, 
GANs attempt to recreate images using deep-learning techniques.26 
GANs achieve this result by using two components: (1) a generator, 
which creates natural looking images, and (2) a discriminator, which 
decides whether the images are real or fake.27 Essentially the “generator 
tries to fool the discriminator by generating real images as far as 
possible.”28 Through this adversarial process between the generator and 
discriminator, the network is able to produce more consistently realistic 
images than it could through a traditional autoencoding structure. 
Most recently, mathematicians and computer scientists have 
attempted to combine GANs with a specialized type of autoencoding 
called “variational autoencoding” (collectively, “VAE-GANs”) to 
 
23. Id.  
24. Id.  
25. Chesney & Citron, supra note 3, at 6; see also Ian Goodfellow et al., 
Generative Adversarial Nets, arXiv (June 10, 2014), https://arxiv.org/ 
 pdf/1406.2661.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2HH-PL2M]. 
26. Chesney & Citron, supra note 3, at 7. 
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produce the most realistic output layers or generated images to date.29 
VAE-GANs work by using the autoencoding process to provide an 
image to the GAN’s generator.30 The GAN’s discriminator then checks 
the image through an iterative process to make it seem more realistic.31 
In addition to the advancements in deepfake videos, researchers have 
also made strides in improving fake audio through GANs32 and other 
techniques.33 These advancements are only the beginning of computer-
image and audio regeneration. Deepfake creators report that the 
technology behind deepfakes “is improving rapidly,” and the creators 
“see no limit to whom they can impersonate.”34 
B. How Deepfakes Got Their Name 
Although the technology (and mathematics) behind deepfakes is 
complex, using deepfake technology is relatively simple. 35  This is 
especially true after an anonymous user on reddit named “deepfake” 
posted computer code on a subreddit forum in late 2017 that allowed 
hobbyists to create deepfakes. 36  In early 2018, another reddit user 
 
29. Enoch Kan, What The Heck Are VAE-GANs?, Towards Data Science 
(Aug. 16, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/what-the-heck-are-vae-
gans-17b86023588a [https://perma.cc/D9J8-NURV]. 
30. Anders Larsen et al., Autoencoding Beyond Pixels Using a Learned Similarity 
Metric, ArXiv (Feb. 10, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1512.09300.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XK4U-AQ3C]. 
31. Id.; Kan, supra note 29. 
32. See generally Chris Donahue et al., Adversarial Audio Synthesis, ArXiv 
(Feb. 12, 2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.04208.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UQ3J-892W]; Yang Gao et al., Voice Impersonation 
Using Generative Adversarial Networks, ArXiv (Feb. 19, 2018), 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1802.06840.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJ6K-9LC8]. 
33. Chesney & Citron, supra note 3, at 7; O’Sullivan, supra note 13. 
34. Drew Harwell, Fake-Porn Videos Are Being Weaponized to Harass and 




35. Alan Zucconi, How to Install FakeApp, Alan Zucconi Blog (Mar. 14, 
2018), https://www.alanzucconi.com/2018/03/14/how-to-install-fakeapp/ 
[https://perma.cc/T3G4-PEMB]. 
36. Jeevan Biswas, What Exactly Is Deepfakes and Why Is This AI-Based 
Creation a Menace, Analytics India Mag. (Feb. 8, 2018), https:// 
 www.analyticsindiamag.com/deepfakes-ai-celebrity-fake-videos/ [https:// 
 perma.cc/K6E6-NJMA]. The actual month that the subreddit was created 
is contested by various Internet sources. Compare id. (claiming the 
“deepfakes” subreddit was created in November 2017), with Aja Romano, 
Why Reddit’s Face-Swapping Celebrity Porn Craze is a Harbinger of 
Dystopia, Vox (Feb. 7, 2018, 5:55 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/1/31/ 
 16932264/reddit-celebrity-porn-face-swapping-dystopia [https://perma.cc/ 
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adapted that code into a user-friendly application called FakeApp.37 
Users of the original code and FakeApp did not need to understand the 
complex mathematical and computational underpinnings of deepfake 
technology. Instead, users merely needed above average computer 
literacy and a sufficiently powerful Graphics Processing Unit (“GPU”) 
in their computer to create deepfakes.38 
News of the user-friendly application spread quickly, and users 
began posting their own computer-generated face-swapping videos on 
the “deepfake” subreddit.39 User and commentators began to call the 
videos “deepfakes” after the subreddit where they were born.40 Many 
users used the technology to perverse ends, often swapping celebrities’ 
faces (primarily female) onto pornographic videos. 41  Users also 
generated “revenge porn” deepfakes by swapping their ex-girlfriends’ 
faces onto pornographic videos. 42  Not all users made pornographic 
deepfakes. Many users enjoyed splicing Nicholas Cage’s face onto 
various movie and television characters.43 Over 80,000 people partic–
ipated in the subreddit before it was eventually shut down due to the 
 
 XP3Q-UDN7] (claiming the “deepfakes” subreddit was created in September 
2017). 
37. Biswas, supra note 36. 
38. Zucconi, supra note 35. 
39. Damon Beres & Marcus Gilmer, A Guide to ‘Deepfakes,’ the Internet’s 
Latest Moral Crisis, Mashable (Feb. 2, 2018), https://mashable.com/ 
 2018/02/02/what-are-deepfakes/#xUHFJsuHqqV [https://perma.cc/ 
 NLP6-FBGF]. 
40. Julia Pimentel, Twitter and Reddit Have Banned ‘Deepfake’ Celebrity 
Porn Videos, Complex (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.complex.com/life/2018/ 
 02/twitter-reddit-and-more-ban-deepfake-celebrity-videos [https://perma 
 .cc/K5TL-GHF9]. 
41. Cole, supra note 4; Alex Hern, AI Used to Face-Swap Hollywood Stars 




42. Larry N. Zimmerman, Cheap and Easily Manipulated Video, 87 J. Kan. 
B. Ass’n, no. 4, Apr. 2014, at 20, https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.ksbar.org/ 
 resource/dynamic/blogs/20180410_111450_30470.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
 9938-ADYD]. 
43. Reid McCarter, Idiots on the Internet Are Getting Really Good at Splicing 
Nic Cage’s Face Onto Every Movie, AV Club (Sept. 4, 2018, 10:30 AM), 
https://news.avclub.com/idiots-on-the-internet-are-getting-really-good-
at-splic-1828799192 [https://perma.cc/RP9Z-QFFZ]; Sam Haysom, 
Nicolas Cage is Being Added to Random Movies Using Face-Swapping 
Technology, Mashable (Jan. 31, 2018), https://mashable.com/2018/01/ 
 31/nicolas-cage-face-swapping-deepfakes/#WGhEd3yKgiqw [https://perma 
 .cc/SQQ3-D9M8]. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019 
Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First Amendment 
425 
largely nonconsensual pornographic nature of the posted content. 44 
Other major platforms such as Twitter, PornHub, Gyfcat, and Discord 
have also banned pornographic deepfakes.45 As of this writing, however, 
FakeApp is still available online.46 
Although many commentators have described the ease of creating 
deepfakes, it should be noted that downloading and using FakeApp is 
probably still too cumbersome for the average computer user. First, to 
“train” a neural network in a reasonable amount of time, a computer 
needs an adequately sophisticated GPU.47 As of 2019, a typical laptop 
does not have the appropriate GPU to perform deep learning and 
generate deepfakes.48 In addition, although there are many tutorials on 
how to download and use FakeApp, 49  the process requires above-
 
44. Beres & Gilmer, supra note 39. Later the subreddit was removed. Alex 
Hern, Reddit Bans ‘Deepfakes’ Face-Swap Porn Community, The 
Guardian (Feb. 8, 2018) https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/ 
 feb/08/reddit-bans-deepfakes-face-swap-porn-community [https://perma.cc/ 
 9T4L-YCDV]. 
45. Megan Farokhmanesh, Deepfakes Are Disappearing from Parts of the 
Web, But They’re Not Going Away, The Verge (Feb. 9, 2018, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/9/16986602/deepfakes-banned-
reddit-ai-faceswap-porn [https://perma.cc/C4E5-D2PH]. 
46. FakeApp Download, https://www.malavida.com/en/soft/fakeapp/#gref 
[https://perma.cc/P87C-SEGP] (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). 
47. Zucconi, supra note 35; Slav Ivanov, Picking a GPU for Deep Learning, 
Slav Ivanov Blog (Nov. 22, 2017), https://blog.slavv.com/picking-a-
gpu-for-deep-learning-3d4795c273b9 [https://perma.cc/UZZ5-SX66]. 
48. See Nicholas Deleon, Why Even Non-Gamers May Want a Powerful 
Graphics Card in Their Next Computer, Consumer Reports (Aug. 29, 
2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/computers/why-even-non-gamers-
may-want-a-powerful-graphics-card/ [https://perma.cc/JVS7-7DA3] 
(indicating that consumers need to elect to upgrade their laptops to include 
GPUs at the time of purchase); Janakiram MSV, In the Era of Artificial 
Intelligence, GPUs Are the New CPUs, Forbes (Aug. 7, 2017, 10:14AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/janakirammsv/2017/08/07/in-the-era-of-
artificial-intelligence-gpus-are-the-new-cpus/#6e5d76755d16 [https://perma 
 .cc/TU2T-J49H] (noting that for the average consumer GPUs were purely 
optional); Zucconi, supra note 35 (stating the training the neural network 
without a GPU would take weeks instead of hours). 
49. See generally Zucconi, supra note 35; tech 4tress, Deepfakes Guide: Fake 
App 2 2 Tutorial. Installation (Totally Simplified, Model Folder Included), 
YouTube (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lsv38PkLsGU& 
 t=83s [https://perma.cc/FVL3-23WU]; Irrelevant Voice, Deepfakes 
Tutorial (FakeApp) (Fake Adult Videos of Celebrities), YouTube (Jan. 
28, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ghTb2kZSpZE [https:// 
 perma.cc/YV6C-5PGQ]; Oliver Lardner, Tutorial for Mac: Deepfakes—
Reddit [MIRROR], Medium (Feb. 7, 2018), https://medium.com/@ 
 oliverlardner/tutorial-for-mac-deepfakes-reddit-mirror-d75eb8069a16 [https:// 
 perma.cc/ER5V-T9PW]. 
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average computer literacy, including understanding torrenting, path 
configuration, file structures, and application versioning.50 Although the 
GPU and technological skills necessary to create deepfakes may be 
hurdles for the average computer user, they are far less cumbersome for 
an avid computer-hobbyist or gamer. As of 2018, individuals could buy 
GPUs sufficient to create deepfakes for as low as $160.51 Although 
regular laptops may be inadequate for creating deepfakes, gaming 
laptops regularly feature sufficiently powerful GPUs.52 As developers 
create more user-friendly deepfake applications, average computer users 
will likely gain greater deepfake-creating capabilities. But even if the 
process of creating deepfakes becomes easier, it will likely always 
involve deliberate affirmative actions on behalf of the creator (such as 
selecting which faces or scenarios to swap). 
C. Defining Deepfakes 
As noted above, the technology driving deepfakes and computer-
generated images is still rapidly evolving. Thus, defining deepfakes is 
especially tricky and researchers are still struggling with a uniform 
definition. 53  Legal scholars Robert Chesney and Danielle Citron 
describe deepfake technology as “leverag[ing] machine-learning algor–
ithms to insert faces and voices into video and audio recordings of 
actual people and enabl[ing] the creation of realistic impersonations out 
of digital whole cloth.” 54  Building on this definition, legal scholar 
Richard Hasen defined deepfakes as “audio and video clips manipulated 
using machine learning and artificial intelligence that can make a 
politician, celebrity, or anyone else appear to say or do anything the 
manipulator wants.”55  Artificial intelligence researcher Miles Brundage 
noted that the term “deepfake” generally refers to a “subset of fake 
video that leverages deep learning . . . to make the faking process 
easier.” 56  Technologist Aviv Ovadya said that deepfakes can be 
 
50. Zucconi, supra note 35. 
51. Ivanov, supra note 47. 
52. Gordon Mah Ung & Alaina Yee, How to Pick the Best Gaming Laptop 
GPU, PCWorld (Sept. 5, 2018, 4:53 PM), https://www.pcworld.com/ 
 article/3237991/laptop-computers/how-to-pick-the-best-gaming-laptop-
gpu.html [https://perma.cc/ES33-UZX2]. 
53. Vincent, supra note 2. 
54. Chesney & Citron, supra note 3, at 4. 
55.  Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices: American 
Election Law in a Post-Truth World, St. Louis U. L. J., 9 (forthcoming 
2020). This Note quotes and cites this article with Professor Hasen’s 
permission. 
56. Vincent, supra note 2; Miles Brundage et. al., The Malicious Use of 
Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation, Future 
of Human. Inst. (Feb. 2018), https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/ 
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described as “audio or video fabrication or manipulation that would 
have been extremely difficult and expensive without AI advances.”57 
All of these definitions include the method of creation (by deep 
learning or artificial intelligence) as a key way to distinguish deepfakes 
from other faked videos. This distinction is very important because the 
use of deep learning in a video’s creation implies that such a video can 
be created more easily than a manually manipulated video. In addition, 
as the technology improves, videos created by deep learning have the 
potential to look more realistic than manually altered videos. Another 
important element of deepfake videos is the “faking” of a face or a 
scenario in a pre-existing video or image. Although to date most 
deepfakes have primarily focused on face-swapping and voice alter–
ations, the technology could be used to swap out other components in 
a video, such as background or objects in a video. A final definition 
must be flexible enough to incorporate any “faking” of an original video 
possible by deep learning technology. Combining all the key elements 
above, we can use this simplified definition: Deepfakes are videos, 
images, and audio created using deep learning to alter the content of 
an original video, image, and/or audio file by face-swapping or scenario 
alterations. 
II. Deepfakes of Political Figures 
As we have seen in Part I, deepfakes have a wide range of uses and 
raise many legal issues. This Note focuses solely on the impact of 
deepfakes targeting political figures, or “political deepfakes.” Through–
out history, individuals have been inclined to use the latest 
communications technology to mock, comment about, and criticize 
politicians.58 Persons in power have been suspicious of such technology, 
often banning or severely restricting its dissemination, usually at the 
expense of growth and the exchange of ideas.59 For instance, upon the 
invention of the printing press in 1456, French King Charles VII sent a 
spy to Mainz to investigate how the device might be used to spread 
political ideas. 60  Charles was concerned that the technology could 
disseminate information very quickly; he was relieved once he learned 




57. Vincent, supra note 2. 
58. Craig Smith et al., The First Amendment—Its Current Condition, in The 
First Amendment—The Challenge of New Technology 9–12 (Sig 
Mickelson & Elena Mier Y. Teran eds., 1989). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 9–10. 
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could be published.61 History teaches us that if we choose to attempt to 
mitigate the risks of a new communication technology, such restrictions 
should be as limited as possible so as not to curtail the benefits of that 
technology. 
From the printing press to the Internet, deepfakes are simply the 
next in a long line of disruptive communications technology that can 
be used to further civic discourse, or misused to deceive and undermine 
public trust. Individuals have already used deepfakes to further public 
discussion. Jordan Peele created a political deepfake of President 
Obama to warn the public of the dangers of political deepfakes in April 
of 2018.62 Many political deepfakes, such as Jordan Peele’s, will likely 
be viewed by courts as “speech on public issues,” which deserves a place 
on the “‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values’ and 
is entitled to special protection.”63 Given the possible beneficial uses of 
deepfakes by satirists, educators, and artists, an outright ban on 
deepfake technology is not only ill-advised but also likely uncon–
stitutional. 
However, because deepfakes use deep learning to reduce the effort 
needed to “fake” a previously made video, bad actors will have a special 
incentive to use this technology not only to mock, but potentially to 
frame, undermine, or blackmail political figures. Chesney and Citron 
outlined eight potential harms to society resulting from the use of 
deepfakes: (1) distortion of democratic discourse, (2) manipulation of 
elections, (3) eroding trust in institutions, (4) exacerbating social 
divisions, (5) undermining public safety, (6) undermining diplomacy, 
(7) jeopardizing national security, and (8) undermining journalism.64 
Political deepfakes are the most likely candidates to perpetrate almost 
all of the harms outlined by Chesney and Citron. For instance, if a 
political deepfake depicting a candidate taking a bribe gets released on 
the eve of an election, such a tape could simultaneously change the 
election results, distort discourse about the candidates, and erode trust 
in public figures and institutions. If the tape agitates activist groups 
enough that they begin to hold public protests or demonstrations, such 
demonstrations could turn violent and undermine public safety. If a 
news outlet runs the story believing it is real and only later finds out it 
is fake, the deepfake could also undermine the public’s faith in 
 
61. Id. 
62. David Mack, This PSA About Fake News from Barack Obama Is Not What 
it Appears, BuzzFeed News (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews 
 .com/article/davidmack/obama-fake-news-jordan-peele-psa-video-buzzfeed# 
 .el7Eqkeo7A [https://perma.cc/PDW2-DQSV]. 
63. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 444 (2011) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 
461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)). 
64. Chesney & Citron, supra note 3, at 20–28. 
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journalism. Although this doomsday scenario may seem extreme, 
deepfakes that manifest even one of these threats to society could still 
cause severe harm. 
The deepfake threat has not gone unnoticed by Congress. In July 
2018, Senator Marco Rubio mused on a potential danger of deepfakes 
as “the ability to influence the outcome [of an election] by putting out 
a video of a candidate on the eve before the election doing or saying 
something strategically placed, strategically altered, in such a way to 
drive some narrative that could flip enough votes in the right place to 
cost someone an election.” 65  Senator Rubio characterized such a 
situation as “not a threat to our elections, but a threat to our Repub–
lic.”66 Senator Mark Warner also specifically addressed deepfakes in his 
draft white paper outlining various policy proposals to regulate social 
media and large technology firms. 67  On September 13, 2018, 
Representatives Adam Schiff, Stephanie Murphy, and Carlos Curbelo 
sent a letter to Director of National Intelligence Dan Coates specifically 
asking the intelligence community to “report to Congress and the public 
about the implications of new technologies that allow malicious actors 
to fabricate audio, video, and still images.”68 
Some legislators have even gone so far as to introduce specific 
legislation to address deepfakes.69 On December 21, 2018, Senator Sasse 
introduced a bill attempting to criminalize the “malicious creation and 
distribution of deepfakes” entitled the “Malicious Deep Fake 
Prohibition Act of 2018.”70 The bill makes it a crime punishable by up 
to ten years imprisonment to: 
 
65. Senator Marco Rubio, Keynote Remarks at The Heritage Foundation’s 
Homeland Security Event on Deep Fakes (July 19, 2018), video available 
at Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National 




67. Senator Mark R. Warner, Potential Policy Proposals for Regulation of 
Social Media and Technology Firms 2 (Aug. 20, 2018) (White Paper 
Draft), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/ 
 2018/08/ftc-2018-0048-d-0104-155263.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y5F-DUQP]. 
68. Letter from Adam B. Schiff, Stephanie Murphy, and Carlos Curbelo, 
Representatives, U.S. House of Representatives, to Daniel R. Coats, Dir., 
Office of Nat’l Intelligence (Sept. 13, 2018), https://schiff.house.gov/imo/ 
 media/doc/2018-09%20ODNI%20Deep%20Fakes%20letter.pdf [https:// 
 perma.cc/D82S-TPQV]. 
69. Kaveh Waddell, Lawmakers Plunge into “Deepfake” War, Axios (Jan. 
31, 2019), https://www.axios.com/deepfake-laws-fb5de200-1bfe-4aaf-9c93-
19c0ba16d744.html [https://perma.cc/JCP3-9HDF]. 
70. Id.; S. 3805, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018). The bill defines “deep fake” as “an 
audiovisual record created or altered in a manner that the record would 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019 
Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First Amendment 
430 
 (1) create, with the intent to distribute, a deep fake with the 
intent that the distribution of the deep fake would facilitate 
criminal or tortious conduct under Federal, State, local, or Tribal 
law; or 
(2) distribute an audiovisual record with – 
(A) actual knowledge that the audiovisual record is a deepfake; 
and 
(B) the intent that the distribution of the audiovisual record 
would facilitate criminal or tortious conduct under Federal, State, 
local or Tribal law.71  
The bill includes the limitation that “any activity protected by the 
First Amendment” is not punishable under the Act.72 Although the bill 
expired at the end of 2018, Sasse’s office indicated that it intends to 
reintroduce the bill.73 Representative Clarke of New York introduced a 
bill entitled the “DEEP FAKES Accountability Act in June of 2019.”74 
This bill requires deepfake creators to include either a watermark or 
disclosure that the audio or video is altered.75 Deepfake creators who 
do not comply with the watermark or disclosure requirements may face 
civil penalties of up to $150,000 per record in fines, five years in jail, or 
both.76 The bill also allows for injunctive relief to comply creators to 
use watermarks or disclosures.77 In addition to the legislation proposed 
by Congress,  several states, including New York, Texas, and Maine, 
introduced legislation to address the harms of deepfakes.78 In October 
 
falsely appear to a reasonable observer to be an authentic record of the 
actual speech or conduct of an individual.” Id. Strikingly, the bill’s 
definition of deepfake does not restrict the manner of creation to videos 
created through deep learning. See id.; supra Part I.C. 
71. S. 3805, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018). Law professor and commentator Orin 
Kerr noted his concern that Senator Sasse’s bill reaches too far, creating 
“federal crimes that prohibit acts undertaken in furtherance of any 
criminal law or tort.” Orin Kerr, Should Congress Pass a “Deep Fakes” 
Law?, The Volokh Conspiracy (Jan. 31, 2019), http://reason.com/ 
 volokh/2019/01/31/should-congress-pass-a-deep-fakes-law [https://perma 
 .cc/43DG-9WBU]. 
72. S. 3805, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018). 
73. Waddell, supra note 69. 
74. H.R. 3230, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019). 
75.  Id. § 2. 
76.  Id.  
77. Id.  
78. Nina Iacono Brown, Congress Wants to Solve Deepfakes by 2020, Slate 
(July 15, 2019, 7:30A.M.), https://slate.com/technology/2019/07/congress-
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of 2019, California passed legislation penalizing the distribution of 
deepfakes of political candidates within 60 days of an election. 79  
Although both federal and state level legislatures have attempted to 
address the harms of deepfakes, whether these measures will comport 
with the First Amendment has yet to be tested in court.   
 Given all of these concerns, this Note must return to our original 
hypothetical. Imagine that you believe that the Donald Trump’s Pee 
Tape video posted by your friend is real. Imagine that you are not the 
only one. Thousands of people believe that this video is the smoking 
gun that proves both that the Russians had information that could have 
compromised Trump and that Russia largely controlled him throughout 
the 2016 election and into his presidency. The video contains imagery 
so graphic that even the Republican base turn against Trump. 
Democratic activist groups are primed to believe such a video and take 
to the streets, protesting in outrage. The House votes to impeach 
Trump on newly discovered evidence of corruption. Republican 
Senators, fearing the repercussions of not acting, ultimately decide to 
remove Trump from office. Only after all of this has taken place does 
video forensics reveal that the video was a deepfake. In this scenario, 
could Trump recover damages from the video’s creator? What would 
those damages be? 
III. Defamation Law as a Remedy 
For defamatory deepfakes in general, individuals or companies may 
have legal remedies to protect their property or publicity under 
copyright law or the tort of right to publicity.80 However, politicians 
will likely struggle to recover under either of these legal theories. 
Regarding copyright law, political figures often do not own much of the 
video taken of them, barring them from any recovery.81 Even if a 
political figure owns the video of themselves, courts will likely not 
punish an individual who uses the video to comment on the political 
 
deepfake-regulation-230-2020.html [https://perma.cc/HT5S-HBVN]; Scott 
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 20902884/california-deepfake-political-ban-election-2020 [https://perma.cc/ 
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80. Chesney & Citron, supra note 3, at 34–35. 
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figure in a non-commercial way, categorizing such commentary as “fair 
use.” For instance, in Dhillon v. Doe,82 the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California held that a non-commercial 
website’s use of a politician’s headshot to criticize the politician was 
“transformative” and “such a use is precisely what the Copyright Act 
envisions as a paradigmatic fair use.”83 Public figures will likely also 
struggle to recover under the right of publicity, or “the inherent right 
of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her 
identity.”84 First, only about thirty states even recognize such a right.85 
Second, and even more importantly, the right to publicity only protects 
the use of someone’s persona for a commercial gain.86 As in the Trump 
hypothetical, many political deepfakes do not seek to profit from their 
creations, so the right of publicity will not provide an appropriate legal 
remedy. 
This brings us to the pièce de résistance: the tort of defamation. 
Defamation law covers both libel (written communications or commun–
ications that persist similarly to written works) and slander (spoken 
communications).87 Although the actual elements of defamation vary 
from state to state, the tort generally consists of several elements as 
outlined in the Second Restatement of Torts: 
 To create liability for defamation there must be: 
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; 
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; 
(c) fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the 
publisher; and 
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special 
harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.88  
 
82. No. C 13-01465 SI, 2014 WL 722592 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014). 
83. Id. at *5. 
84. 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 3:1 
(2d ed. 2018). 
85. Amanda Tate, Note, Miley Cyrus and the Attack of the Drones: The Right 
of Publicity and Tabloid Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 17 Tex. 
Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 73, 84 (2015). 
86. McCarthy, supra note 84. 
87. Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation: Libel, Slander, and 
Related Problems §§ 2:4.1–.2 (4th ed. 2010). 
88. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (Am. Law Inst. 1977). 
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However, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,89 the Supreme Court 
replaced the traditional third element of “fault amounting to at least 
negligence” with a higher standard, requiring proof that the speech’s 
publisher acted with actual malice in publishing speech directed at 
public officials. 90 Actual malice is found when the statement is made 
“with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether 
it was false or not.”91 Mere negligence does not suffice to meet an actual-
malice standard.92 
The actual-malice standard creates an exceptionally high burden of 
proof for public officials in defamation suits, as it is very difficult to 
prove that a publisher knew the information she published was false or 
that her actions regarding the information’s truthfulness rose to the 
level of recklessness. The Supreme Court created such a high burden to 
balance the competing interests of public officials who sought to protect 
their reputations from defamation against the First Amendment’s 
safeguarding of high-value political speech. The Court reasoned that 
erroneous statements are “inevitable in free debate,” adding that even 
erroneous statements should be protected to provide the freedom-of-
expression principle the adequate “breathing space” it needs to 
survive.93 The Court held that when public officials bring a defamation 
suit, any mental state on behalf of the publisher lower than actual 
malice is “constitutionally deficient [in its] failure to provide the 
safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” 94  Such a standard still 
provides recourse for political figures because if they can prove that 
individuals acted with actual malice when publishing false and defam–
atory statements about them, then the statement is not protected under 
the First Amendment.95 
Applying this rigorous standard to political deepfakes is relatively 
straightforward. Deepfakes are intended to be “fakes” or falsehoods. 
Unlike an article where an individual might not be sure about one 
particular fact regarding a political figure, creators of deepfakes know 
 
89. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
90. Id. at 283; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (Am. Law Inst. 
1977). The Court later extended the holding from Sullivan to apply not 
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93. Id. at 271–72. 
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95. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (“The 
freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of 
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that the content they are creating is false. Creating a deepfake requires 
a person with above-average computer literacy to download a program 
and take a series of non-trivial, affirmative steps to swap someone’s face 
onto another video.96 Even as technology makes it easier to create 
deepfakes, it will still be hard to prove that an individual “accidentally” 
created a video of a public figure in a compromising situation. Deep–
fakes are designed to look realistic and to make others believe that the 
face swapped onto the fake video is in fact the person it seems to be. 
The old adage “seeing is believing” still holds as videos are generally 
considered highly reliable evidence of past events.97 A deepfake creator 
will not only know that what she is creating is false, but since she is 
creating a video, many more persons are likely to believe that what the 
video depicts is true. 
Nevertheless, good-faith deepfake creators will have a rather easy 
shield against culpability: any indication, either in the video itself or on 
the location (webpage) where the video was posted, that the video is a 
fake. If a deepfake creator supplies a watermark or disclaimer, clearly 
indicating the video is a fake, such information could be used as 
compelling evidence that the creator reasonably believed that others 
would not treat the video as an actual representation of the political 
figure. If a third party could not reasonably believe the video was a 
depiction of the political figure, then the video is not defamatory.98 
Given the ease of providing such a disclaimer or watermark, this will 
also work against bad actors who intend to use the video to deceive. If 
an individual creates a defamatory deepfake without providing any 
indication that the video is fake, it seems likely that she knew or had 
reckless disregard for the video’s falsity. 
In addition to the actual-malice standard, politicians will also have 
to establish the other elements of defamation: “a false and defamatory 
statement concerning another,” “an unprivileged publication to a third 
party,” and “either actionability of the statement irrespective of special 
harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.”99 The 
Second Restatement of Torts defines a defamatory statement as one 
that “tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the 
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating 
or dealing with him.”100 Some videos will be completely innocuous (e.g., 
 
96. See supra Part I.B. 
97. Brundage et. al., supra note 56, at 46. 
98. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (holding 
that the publisher was not liable for defamation because the parody ad 
“could not be reasonably understood as describing actual facts about 
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99. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (Am. Law Inst. 1977). 
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a video of a politician watering her garden) and thus, not defamatory. 
Bad actors, however, are likely to be more interested in using deepfake 
technology to place political figures in compromising situations, aiming 
to lower the reputation of those political figures. The trier of fact will 
have the final word on whether the content is deemed defamatory. 
Political figures seeking to recover damages will also have to prove 
that the deepfake was published and that they were harmed by that 
publication. A statement is published through “any act by which the 
defamatory matter is . . . communicated to a third person.”101 Posting 
a deepfake online would certainly constitute a publication. Finally, the 
political figure could argue that the publication caused her special harm 
(or some kind of monetary loss), such as the loss of an election or 
reduced campaign donations.102 Even if the political figure did not suffer 
a particularized harm, she could argue that the publication caused 
general societal harm (such as the harms outlined in Part II). 
IV. Satire or Parody as a Defense 
 
A good-faith deepfake creator’s most readily available defense is an 
acknowledgement in or near the video that the video is false. The more 
obvious the disclaimer or watermark, the less likely such a video will 
be misconstrued by a member of the general public that such a video 
is actually real. Some political satirists, however, might not want to be 
constrained by the addition of a watermark or disclaimer and instead 
may claim a privilege by satire or parody. The Supreme Court noted 
the importance of satire in the political-discourse context in Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, stating that “[d]espite their sometimes 
caustic nature . . . graphic depictions and satirical cartoons have played 
a prominent role in public and political debate.”103 
In that case, Jerry Falwell sued Hustler Magazine for defamation 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress after Hustler editors 
drew a cartoon in which Falwell discussed his “first time” as a “drunken 
incestuous rendezvous with his mother.”104 At trial, the jury rejected 
Falwell’s defamation claim based on its findings that no reasonable 
person would believe that the cartoon described actual facts; however, 
it found in favor of Falwell on his intentional infliction of emotion 
distress claim.105 On appeal, Hustler Magazine claimed that awarding 
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress violated its First 
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Amendment rights. 106  Falwell contended that the cartoon was so 
“outrageous” that it was distinguishable from a traditional political 
cartoon.107 The Court, inherently suspicious of an “outrageousness” 
argument, rejected Falwell’s position, noting: 
“Outrageousness” in the area of political and social discourse has 
an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to 
impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or 
perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An 
“outrageousness” standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding 
refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in 
question may have an adverse emotional impact on the 
audience.108  
The Court instead held that “public figures . . . may not recover 
for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of 
[satirical] publications . . . without showing in addition that the 
publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with 
‘actual malice.’”109 The Court adopted New York Times’s actual-malice 
standard to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress to 
provide “adequate ‘breathing space’ to the freedoms protected by the 
First Amendment.”110 
The Supreme Court’s view of outrageousness might seem like a 
blank check for satirists and parody makers to use deepfakes to mock 
politicians. The question remains, however, whether deepfakes can be 
considered satirical works in general. The satire at issue in Hustler was 
a hand-drawn caricature that the jury found could not “reasonably be 
understood as describing actual facts about [respondent] or actual 
events in which [he] participated.”111 Deepfakes, unlike caricatures and 
other parodies, could reasonably be understood to depict facts about an 
individual. This reasonableness element is crucial for establishing 
liability against a defendant asserting a parody or satire defense. In 
Farah v. Esquire,112 the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit noted that “satire is effective as social commentary 
precisely because it is often grounded in truth.”113 Thus, “[t]he test [for 
satire] . . . is not whether some actual readers were misled, but whether 
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the hypothetical reasonable reader could be (after time for 
reflection).”114 What it takes to mislead the “hypothetical reasonable 
reader” will certainly evolve as deepfake technology improves to mirror 
true human interaction. If the video is extremely realistic, and the 
actions are outrageous but within the realm of possibility, a court may 
find that a deepfake intended to be a satire is actually defamatory 
speech because a reasonable viewer would not be able to distinguish the 
fake video from reality. 
V. Injunctions as a Remedy 
If a political figure can prove that a publisher acted with actual 
malice to create a defamatory deepfake, and that the deepfake could 
not be considered a satire, then the political figure will be able to 
recover the traditional tort remedy of monetary damages.115 Despite the 
attraction of monetary damages, they do nothing to stop the ongoing 
reputational loss caused by the deepfake’s continued existence on the 
Internet.116 Nor do monetary damages remedy the societal damages 
caused by the video if it is allowed to persist in the public sphere. 
Moreover, many bad actors posting deepfakes might be judgment-proof, 
denying the political figure any recovery.  
Given the inadequacy of monetary damages, injunctions may be a 
better avenue to address some of the harms caused by deepfakes. Unlike 
monetary damages, an injunction is an equity-based remedy designed 
to “order the defendant to refrain from specified conduct.”117 Political 
figures are likely to favor injunctions because removing the original 
video from the Internet will remedy the imminent issue of reputational 
loss caused by a defamatory political deepfake.118 Courts can grant 
permanent injunctions that occur after an adjudication on the merits 
of the claim, or preliminary injunctions that occur prior to adjudications 
based on the likelihood of success on the merits.119 Although preliminary 
injunctions may be favored because they remove an offending video 
from the Internet sooner than other remedies, they face a heightened 
First Amendment hurdle because they risk censoring protected 
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speech.120 Thus, this Note focuses primarily on the potential use of 
permanent injunctions against defamatory political deepfakes. 
A. Injunctions and the First Amendment 
The First Amendment protects individuals’ rights to freedom of 
religion, speech, the press, and assembly.121 Since the founding of the 
United States, courts have been keen to avoid prior restraints on speech, 
or restraints on expression before occurs.122 In Near v. Minnesota,123 the 
Supreme Court established that injunctions against free speech and the 
press usually amount to a prior restraint on expression.124 In Near, the 
Court held a state statute that perpetually enjoined individuals or 
corporations (including the press) who published “a malicious, 
scandalous and defamatory newspaper or other periodical” was an 
unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom of the press.125 The broad 
nature of the statute led to the “effective censorship” of any publisher 
who was convicted of publishing an “offending newspaper or 
periodical,” because all future publications regarding the offending 
matter (defamatory or not) would be subject to court review.126 The 
Court held that the threat of enjoining the press’ constitutionally 
protected activity outweighed the potential that publishing scandalous 
and defamatory information may disturb the public peace.127 
Similarly, the Supreme Court struck down injunctions against press 
activities in both New York Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon 
Papers) 128  and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart 129  as uncon–
stitutional prior restraints on the freedom of speech and the press. In 
Pentagon Papers, the Second Circuit enjoined the New York Times and 
the Washington Post from publishing the “Pentagon Papers,” a Defense 
Department study of American activities in Southeast Asia, after the 
government argued that the information’s publication would endanger 
 
120. See id. at 150. 
121. U.S. Const. amend. I. 
122. See Anthony Lewis, Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the 
First Amendment 51 (1991); Ardia, supra note 10, at 32. The perception 
that injunctions were prior restraints on speech and therefore invalid as 
an equitable remedy was so pervasive commentators described it as the 
“no injunction rule.” Id. at 18. 
123. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
124. Id. at 722–23. 
125. Id. at 702–03, 722–23. 
126. Id. at 712. 
127. Id. at 721–22. 
128. (Pentagon Papers) 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
129. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
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national security. 130  In Nebraska Press, a state court feared that 
reporting on a sensational criminal trial in a small community would 
endanger the defendant’s right to a fair trial.131 The court crafted a 
restrictive order prohibiting the press from reporting on certain aspects 
of the trial.132 In both cases, the Supreme Court grappled with a careful 
balancing test between constitutionally protected speech and important 
governmental interests (national security) or individual rights (the right 
to a fair trial).133 And in both cases, the Supreme Court held that the 
First Amendment’s free-speech guarantee outweighed either competing 
interest.134 
In the case of deepfakes, courts must also balance the speech 
contained in defamatory political deepfakes against important 
governmental interests, such as safeguarding free elections, promoting 
trust in public officials, defending national security, and protecting 
truth itself.135 It is important to note that in Near, Pentagon Papers, 
and Nebraska Press, the balancing test involved either a statute or a 
court-ordered remedy that both targeted an entire industry (the press) 
and included speech that likely was not libelous.136 None of the cases 
addressed an individual or private wrong of one person defaming 
another. For political deepfakes, it is likely the defamatory threat would 
not come from the press, but instead from a private individual 
intentionally attempting to disparage a political figure. In addition, 
unlike the cases discussed above, the expression in the deepfake would 
be clearly false.137 Thus, if an injunction could be carefully crafted to 
include only the speech in the defamatory deepfake itself, the resulting 
balancing-test analysis would pit unprotected false and defamatory 
speech against important governmental interests. To determine 
whether a court might hold that the important (some might even say 
“compelling”) governmental interests outweigh any free-speech con–
cerns, we must take a closer look at several constitutionally permissible 
prior restraints on expression. 
 
130. Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714. 
131. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 543–45. 
132. Id. at 543–44. 
133. Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 718; Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 543.  
134. Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714; Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 570. 
135. See supra Part II. 
136. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 702–03 (1931); Pentagon Papers, 403 
U.S. at 714; Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 570. 
137. See supra Part I. 
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B. Constitutionally Permissible Injunctions on Expression 
Although prior restraints on expression bear “a heavy presumption 
against [their] constitutional validity,” not all prior restraints are pro–
hibited by the Constitution.138 In Near, the Supreme Court outlined 
four exceptions to the prior-restraint rule: (1) key issues of national 
security, such as troop movements or sailing dates; (2) obscene 
publications; (3) incitement to acts of violence or attempts to overthrow 
the government; and (4) to “protect private rights” in accordance with 
the rules of courts of equity.” 139  Other than the national-security 
exception, all the exceptions outlined in Near relate to speech that falls 
outside of the First Amendment’s traditional protective scope.140 
1. Obscenity 
Obscenity has no protection under the First Amendment.141 In Roth 
v. United States, the Court held that “obscenity is not within the area 
of constitutionally protected speech or press.”142 The Court reasoned 
that “lewd and obscene . . . utterances are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth 
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed 
by the social interest in order and morality.”143 Since obscenity provides 
such low social value, the Court in Miller v. California144 affirmed a 
broader test to determine what constitutes obscenity. A trier of fact 
must determine whether (1) “‘the average person, applying contemp–
orary community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest”;145 (2) the work depicts offensive sexual 
conduct; and (3) “the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value.”146 
Given that obscenity receives no constitutional protection, states 
have some ability to censor lewd and obscene publications as long as 
they take precautions to avoid censoring protected speech. In Times 
 
138. Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714; Near, 283 U.S. at 716. 
139. Near, 283 U.S. at 716. 
140. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555, 559 
(1985); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969); Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).  
141. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)). 
144. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).  
145. Id. at 16 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 489).  
146. Id. 
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Film Corp. v. City of Chicago,147 the Supreme Court upheld a local 
ordinance requiring filmmakers to submit their films to a review board 
and obtain approval from the city prior to a public exhibition.148 The 
Court clarified this holding in Freedman v. Maryland, 149  where it 
affirmed that states could use noncriminal processes, including prior 
submission, to censor obscenity in films. 150  However, the prior 
submission must “take[] place under procedural safeguards designed to 
obviate the dangers of a censorship system.”151 
2. Copyright 
A copyright holder has “the right to exclude others from using his 
property.”152 Individuals cannot copyright facts or ideas, but they can 
copyright a particular “expression.”153 Although copyright law creates 
a restriction on speech, the Supreme Court held in Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises154 that the First Amendment does 
not protect speech that infringes on another’s copyright.155 Under the 
Copyright Act of 1976, a federal court “may . . . grant temporary and 
final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent 
or restrain infringement of a copyright.”156 Under this statute, modern 
courts have been willing to grant not only permanent injunctions but 
also preliminary injunctions to protect a plaintiff’s property interests.157 
The practice of granting injunctions in copyright and patent cases 
became so pervasive that in 2006 the Supreme Court reminded lower 
courts that in granting injunctions, they should not abandon 
“traditional equitable considerations.”158 In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., the Supreme Court noted that it has “consistently rejected 
invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule 
that an injunction automatically follows a determination that a 
 
147. 365 U.S. 43 (1961). 
148. Id. at 46.  
149. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
150. Id. at 58. 
151. Id. 
152. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (quoting 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)). 
153. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 119, at 166. 
154. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
155. Id. at 555–60; Lemley & Volokh, supra note 119, at 150, 166. 
156. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012). 
157. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 119, at 150, 158–59. 
158. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006). 
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copyright has been infringed.”159 Under eBay, a copyright- or patent-
holding plaintiff must satisfy a four-factor test before a permanent 
injunction can be granted to protect her intellectual property interest.160 
The four factors are: (1) the plaintiff “has suffered an irreparable 
injury”; (2) “remedies available at law . . . are inadequate to compensate 
for [the] injury”; (3) “considering the balance of hardships between [the 
parties], a remedy in equity is warranted”; and (4) “the public interest 
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”161 Although eBay 
was a patent case, lower courts have extended its holding to copyright 
cases involving preliminary- or permanent-injunction requests.162 
C. Injunctions on Defamatory Speech 
Like obscenity and copyrights, defamatory speech has only limited 
protection under the First Amendment. 163  Unlike obscenity and 
copyrights, however, courts have been hesitant to allow injunctions on 
defamatory speech.164 The Supreme Court did not formally address the 
issue of injunctions against non-press related defamation until 2005.165 
In Tory v. Cochran, 166  the Court accepted a case on post-trial 
injunctions against defamatory speech, but Cochran’s untimely death 
prevented a final resolution of the issue.167 The Tory case arose out of 
a dispute between renowned attorney Johnnie Cochran and Ulysses 
Tory, a disgruntled prior client of Cochran’s law firm.168 Dissatisfied 
with Cochran’s services, Tory picketed outside Cochran’s office with 
 
159. Id. at 392–93. 
160. Id. at 391. 
161. Id. 
162. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77 (2nd Cir. 2010) (holding that “eBay 
applies with equal force (a) to preliminary injunctions (b) that are issued 
for alleged copyright infringement”); Peter Lettersese & Assocs. v. World 
Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1323 (citing eBay’s four-factor 
test as the appropriate criteria to evaluate a permanent injunction in a 
copyright case); Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 
543 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying eBay’s four-factor test to analyze a 
permanent injunction in a copyright case); see also Anthony DiSarro, 
Freeze Frame: The Supreme Court’s Reaffirmation of the Substantive 
Principles of Preliminary Injunctions, 47 Gonz. L. Rev. 51, 83 (2013). 
163. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002). 
164. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 119, at 149–50. 
165. See generally Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734 (2005). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 737–38; Erwin Chemerinsky, Injunction in Defamation Cases, 57 
Syracuse L. Rev. 157, 162 (2007). Chemerinsky served as Tory’s counsel 
in Tory. 544 U.S. at 735. 
168. Chemerinsky, supra note 167, at 158. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019 
Defamatory Political Deepfakes and the First Amendment 
443 
other discontented clients.169 Cochran sued Tory and the picketers for 
defamation. After Tory indicated that he would “continue to engage in 
[the defamatory] activity in the absence of a court order,” the California 
Superior Court issued an injunction prohibiting Tory from “orally 
uttering statements” about Cochran and his law firm in “any public 
forum.” 170  Tory challenged the injunction, alleging that it was an 
unconstitutional prior restraint on his free-speech rights. 171  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the specific question of “[w]hether 
a permanent injunction as a remedy in a defamation action, preventing 
all future speech about an admitted public figure, violates the First 
Amendment.”172 
The case took an unexpected turn when Cochran died one week 
after oral argument.173 Because the injunction against Tory was still in 
effect after Cochran’s death, the Court held the case was not moot.174 
However, the Court held that the injunction had lost its underlying 
rationale of preventing Tory from coercing Cochran to “pay a ‘tribute’” 
for Tory to desist in the defamatory activity.175 The Court adopted a 
very narrow holding: “the injunction, as written, now amounts to an 
overly broad prior restraint upon speech, lacking plausible 
justification.”176 Although the Court defined the current injunction as a 
prior restraint on speech, it left the door open for injunctions against 
defamatory speech in the future: “If . . . injunctive relief may still be 
warranted, any appropriate party remains free to ask for such relief. 
We express no view on the constitutional validity of any such new relief, 
tailored to these changed circumstances, should it be entered.”177 
Although the Supreme Court has not resolved the issue of the 
constitutionally of injunctions against defamatory speech, lower courts 
have begun to experiment with injunctions in the new age of Internet 
defamation.178 According to a survey by David Ardia of more than 242 
decisions involving injunctions against defamatory speech, “at least 
fifty-six decisions . . . granted or affirmed [the] injunctions,” with a 
 
169. Id. at 159. 
170. Tory, 544 U.S. at 735–36. 
171. Chemerinsky, supra note 167, at 161. 
172. Tory, 544 U.S. at 735–36; Chemerinsky, supra note 167. 
173. Tory, 544 U.S. at 736. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 736–38. 
176. Id. at 738. 
177. Id. at 738–39. 
178. Ardia, supra note 10, at 4. 
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stark increase in the number of courts granting injunctions after 2000.179 
Both federal180 and state181 courts have permitted injunctions against 
defamatory speech, although courts vary widely in defining the 
appropriate scope of those injunctions.182 Courts tend to rely on three 
primary justifications when granting permanent injunctions against 
defamatory speech: “(1) the speech impugned the plaintiff’s property 
interest; (2) the defendant engaged in a continuing course of conduct 
that caused the plaintiff harm; or (3) the speech had been adjudged to 
be defamatory.” 183  The most common reason cited for upholding 
injunctions against speech is that such speech had already been 
adjudged to be defamatory, therefore an injunction against it would not 
be a prior restraint on protected speech.184 
Federal courts are split on the issue of injunctions against defam–
atory speech. Although some circuits have taken the traditional view 
that “equity does not enjoin a libel or slander,”185 the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Ninth Circuits have permitted at least limited injunctions against 
defamatory or fraudulent speech.186 Both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits 
permitted injunctions against defamatory speech only if the injunctions 
 
179. Id. at 42. 
180. See infra text accompanying notes 186–190 (highlighting that, although 
federal courts are split, some courts such as the Sixth Circuit issue limited 
injunctions for defamatory speech). 
181. Ohio, Georgia, Minnesota, California, Kentucky, and Montana have 
adopted rules allowing injunctions on speech that courts deem 
defamatory. See Ardia, supra note 10, at 48–50; O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty. 
Tenants Union, 327 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ohio 1975); Retail Credit Co. v. 
Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54, 62 (Ga. 1975); Advanced Training Sys., Inc. v. 
Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 1984); Balboa Island Vill. 
Inn v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 348–49 (Cal. 2007); Hill v. Petrotech Res. 
Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Ky. 2010); St. James Healthcare v. Cole, 178 
P.3d 696, 703 (Mont. 2008) (adding that not every injunction that 
amounts to a prior restraint is “impermissible”). 
182. Ardia, supra note 10, at 52–57 (outlining four types of injunctions utilized 
by various federal and state courts). 
183. Id. at 43–44. 
184. Id. at 48. 
185. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 814 F.2d 663, 672 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (quoting Kukatush Mining Corp. v. SEC, 108 F.Supp. 508, 510–11 
(D.D.C. 1961)); Metro. Opera Ass’n v. Local 100, Hotel Emps. & Rest. 
Emps. Int’l Union, 239 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2001). 
186. See San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125 
F.3d 1230, 1239 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding an injunction against 
fraudulent and defamatory signs held by union members during a labor 
dispute); Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d 38, 51 (5th Cir. 1992); 
Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1208–09 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(Wellford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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were limited to speech that had been previously adjudged to be 
defamatory. 187  In Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, Carpenter, a company 
owner who had previously been involved in administrative and judicial 
proceedings with two attorneys, wrote and sent defamatory letters 
about the attorneys to the President of the attorneys’ workplace.188 The 
attorneys sued Carpenter for defamation and sought a permanent 
injunction preventing Carpenter from publishing further defamatory 
statements. 189  Through dual concurring opinions, the Sixth Circuit 
granted a limited injunction emphasizing that because Carpenter’s 
defamatory statements were “frequent and continu[ous],” an injunction 
was an appropriate remedy to “prevent future injury to [the attorneys’] 
personal reputation[s].”190 
Other circuit courts have not directly addressed the issue of 
whether any injunction against defamatory speech constitutes an 
unconstitutional prior restraint; but they have rejected proposed 
injunctions on the basis that they were overbroad.191 The First Circuit 
recently took this approach in Sindi v. El-Moslimany.192 There, the First 
Circuit struck down an injunction prohibiting an individual from 
“publishing ‘orally, in writing, through direct electronic commun–
ications, or by directing others to website or blogs reprinting’ six 
statements that the district court concluded were defamatory.”193 The 
trial court granted a permanent injunction against a woman engaged in 
an online campaign to smear and defame a scientist whom she believed 
was engaged in an affair with her husband. 194  The circuit court 
effectively applied a strict-scrutiny test to the injunction.195 Since the 
trial court’s injunction was not “as narrowly tailored as possible to 
 
187. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d at 51 (ordering the district court to “narrow its 
previous language so as to enjoin the dissemination of information relating 
to . . . the subject of the underlying suit”); Lothschuetz, 898 F.2d at 1208–
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injunction “to the statements which have been found in this and in prior 
proceedings to be false and libelous”). 
188. Lothschuetz, 898 F.2d at 1203. 
189. Id. at 1203–04. 
190. Id. at 1208–09 (Wellford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
191. See Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 34 (1st Cir. 2018); McCarthy v. 
Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 461–62 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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195. Id. at 30, 37 n.16. 
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avoid censoring protected speech,” the circuit court held that it 
amounted to an unconstitutional prior restraint.196 
In dissent, Judge Barron argued against the “application of strict 
scrutiny.” 197  Barron relied on Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of 
Western New York 198 and Madsen v. Women’s Health Center199 to 
assert that the Supreme Court has upheld injunctions against speech as 
a prophylactic measure when the enjoined parties were likely to 
continue to engage in the unprotected conduct.200 Barron argued that 
the appropriate standard of review for injunctions against defamatory 
speech should be one that “burden[s] no more speech than necessary to 
serve a significant government interest,”201 not that the injunction is 
“the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.”202 
Thus, courts have left open two key questions: (1) whether all 
injunctions against defamatory speech constitute unconstitutional prior 
restraints; and (2) if some injunctions are permissible, what is the 
appropriate scope of injunctions against defamatory speech so that the 
injunctions comport with the First Amendment. In an effort to explore 
whether some injunctions may be permissible under the First 
Amendment, David Ardia sorted injunctions against defamatory speech 
into four types based on their restrictiveness.203 Type I injunctions 
“prohibit[] a party from making any statements about the plaintiff.”204 
These injunctions are extremely broad and highly unlikely to pass a 
First Amendment challenge. Type II injunctions “prohibit a party from 
publishing any defamatory statements about the plaintiff.”205 Type II 
injunctions are also likely to be overbroad because “they are not precise 
enough to put the defendant on notice as to what speech will violate 
the injunction.”206 Although both Type I and Type II injunctions target 
individuals who have engaged in defamatory conduct in the past, they 
overreach and effectively deprive the defendants of the “breathing 
 
196. Id. at 35. 
197. Id. at 45. 
198. 519 U.S. 357, 381–82 (1997). 
199. 512 U.S. 753, 768–71 (1994). 
200. Sindi, 896 F.3d at 45–46. 
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204. Id. 
205. Id. at 53. 
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space” necessary to engage in public debate.207 Such restrictions amount 
to unconstitutional prior restraints on speech. 
Type III injunctions “prohibit a party from publishing certain 
enumerated statements about the plaintiff without limiting the 
injunction to the specific statements that have been found to be 
defamatory.”208 Type III injunctions are probably the closest to the 
injunction granted by the trial court in Sindi.209 Type III injunctions 
are attractive to plaintiffs who have been defamed by spoken words or 
written commentaries because the injunctions are flexible enough to 
capture potential defamatory speech that has not yet been published. 
But some courts may consider Type III injunctions unconstitutional 
prior restraints because they cover speech that has not yet been 
adjudged defamatory. In addition, Type III injunctions are not be the 
least-restrictive remedy in most cases, so they are not likely to survive 
a strict-scrutiny analysis. However, some courts have been willing to 
permit such injunctions if the defendant’s defamatory conduct is either 
ongoing or coercive.210 In cases where the defendant admits that she 
plans to continue engaging in defamatory conduct, a court may find 
that preventing harassment serves as a sufficiently important interest 
to permit an injunction.211 If, however, a specific defamatory work could 
be targeted with precision, Type III injunctions may be overly broad. 
Thus, we are left with Type IV injunctions, which “only prohibit[] 
further publication, or orders the removal of the specific statements a 
court or jury has found are defamatory.”212 Type IV injunctions are the 
narrowest possible injunctive remedy; thus, if a plaintiff can articulate 
a compelling interest for the injunction, it may even clear strict 
scrutiny’s high hurdle. But Type IV injunctions are exceedingly difficult 
to apply against spoken words or specific passages of written 
commentary because defamatory comments made in this manner are 
often very contextual.213 Type IV injunctions are more easily applied in 
cases where a video or a complete work is posted on the Internet. The 
 
207. N. Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964). 
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injunction can be tailored to that specific work in an almost surgical 
fashion, removing only the files or words deemed unprotected while 
leaving intact the remaining protected speech. In many ways, these very 
limited injunctions against defamatory speech can work in the same 
way as injunctions against obscenity by targeting a specific expressive 
work. In dicta, the First Circuit mused on this distinction, noting that 
the “obscenity doctrine proscribes specific expressive works (such as 
books or movies) that . . . lack ‘serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value,’” while “injunction[s] that prevent[] in perpetuity the 
utterance of particular words and phrases after a defamation trial is 
quite a different matter.”214 
Thus, courts have not developed a consensus on how to address 
injunctions against defamatory speech. Even so, examples of permissible 
injunctions in obscenity and copyright cases, as well as Ardia’s 
framework for injunctions against defamatory speech, can serve as a 
basis for determining whether injunctions against defamatory political 
deepfakes might survive a First Amendment challenge. 
VI. Injunctions on Defamatory Deepfakes 
Deepfakes are strikingly different from many other forms of 
defamatory speech in both the manner they are created and in their 
form of expression. First, unlike other defamatory speech, all of a 
deepfake’s content is inherently false, so there is a higher presumption 
of a culpable mental state on the part of the deepfake creator. Second, 
deepfakes have little social value because they are inherently false and 
they undermine the public’s ability to distinguish what is true from 
what is false. Finally, it is easier to enjoin the expressive form of 
deepfakes, as opposed to enjoining their underlying ideas, because 
deepfake creators need the assistance of artificial intelligence to 
generate deepfakes. 
In most defamatory speech cases involving spoken or written words, 
it is highly unlikely that all of the expression is untrue. This is exactly 
the case, however, with deepfakes: every frame is a falsehood. As 
defined above, deepfakes “alter the content of an original video, image, 
and/or audio file by face swapping or scenario alterations.”215 Unlike 
with spoken or written words, when a court enjoins a deepfake, it 
eliminates the possibility that the content could be republished in the 
same form (video, photo, or audio) in a true manner. Even if the 
publisher changes a few frames in the deepfake, the remainder would 
still be false. At best, reproducing a deepfake without some offending 
frames still creates false, but non-defamatory, content. In United States 
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v. Alvarez, 216  the Supreme Court upheld some First Amendment 
protections even for false speech.217 Still, the value of protecting false 
speech is not sufficient to outweigh important or compelling 
governmental interests, such as free and fair elections or national 
security. 
In addition, a deepfake creator intentionally alters every frame of a 
video to intentionally distort reality. Such a calculated act creates a 
much stronger presumption that a deepfake creator has a culpable 
mental state as compared to a publisher of an angry social-media post 
who slips in an untrue detail about another person. Blog-post creators 
may credibly deny that they knew a specific detail of their blog was 
false when it was published; but deepfake creators will have a much 
more difficult time convincing a fact-finder that they were unaware they 
were creating and publishing a deepfake. Thus, the way deepfakes are 
created brings deepfake cases in line with copyright or obscenity cases 
in that there is more evidence that the infringing material was created 
by someone with a guilty mental state. In copyright cases, it is 
exceedingly difficult for a copier to convince a fact-finder that she 
coincidentally replicated another author’s work word for word. 
Similarly, in obscenity cases, it is unlikely that a jury would find that 
a pornographic video’s publisher was unaware that a group-sex video 
she published would be considered porn. Indeed, given the current 
technological skills needed for deepfake creation, it might be harder for 
plaintiffs to prove a culpable mental state in many copyright and 
obscenity cases than it would be in a deepfake case. 
Second, defamatory deepfakes, similar to obscenity, have little 
social value. There are some positive uses for non-defamatory deepfakes, 
such as artistic expression or satire,218 but the underlying content of a 
defamatory deepfake will always be (at minimum) a recklessly created 
falsehood. Combining the deepfake’s ability to spread falsehoods with 
the video medium’s generally perceived truthfulness undermines the 
public’s ability to believe its own eyes. Although our society can tolerate 
some protections for falsehoods, once a deepfake crosses the line into 
defamation it is stripped of all social value. Defamatory deepfakes do 
not contribute to public discourse; instead they distort open-forum 
principles by undermining the concept of truth itself. Similar to 
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obscenity, any benefit derived from defamatory deepfakes “is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”219 
Third, and similar to copyright, it is easier to enjoin a deepfake as 
a “form of expression” than it would be for most other forms of 
defamatory speech.220 Deepfakes, by definition, must be created “with 
the use of deep learning.” 221  Deepfakes create a specific type of 
electronic file (either video, photo, or audio), and a court has the ability 
to make the distinction between enjoining the specific form of 
expression (i.e., content created with the aid of artificial intelligence) 
and enjoining the underlying ideas or speech in the video. Although it 
might seem that enjoining only the form of expression does not go far 
enough to protect political figures from defamatory speech, such an 
argument is unavailing. The novel threat of deepfakes is that the 
manner in which they are created—and the manner in which they are 
viewed—makes them more likely to be perceived as real. For “seeing is 
believing,” and realistic-looking videos are generally more likely to be 
believed than written commentaries.222 Thus, enjoining the form of 
expression, as opposed to the underlying speech, at worst returns 
political figures to the status quo. 
VII. Appropriate Scope for Injunctions Against 
Political Defamatory Deepfakes 
Although defamation may be the appropriate legal theory by which 
political figures should address deepfakes in a court of law, obscenity 
and copyright law provide the appropriate remedies. Similar to the 
obscenity test defined in Miller, the standard to determine whether a 
deepfake is defamatory should be: if “the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards would find the work, taken as a 
whole” to be defamatory and “lack[ing] serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value,”223 then the deepfake is defamatory. If the 
entire work is not considered as a whole, a deepfake creator could 
change just one frame in the offending video and repost it to the 
Internet in its entirety. Once the “work as a whole” has been adjudged 
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defamatory, then the court can craft a narrow injunction related to the 
specific deepfake. 
Erwin Chemerinsky, who served as counsel for Ulysses Tory at the 
Supreme Court, argued against injunctions of defamatory speech: “Any 
effective injunction will be overbroad and any limited injunction will be 
ineffective.”224 Given the properties of a deepfake, it is possible to craft 
an injunction that is both narrowly tailored and effective. For instance, 
in copyright cases, courts have the original work to compare against 
the potentially infringing content. Courts can specifically identify 
whether a particular expression sufficiently mimics that of the 
copyrighted work.225 Similarly, with deepfakes, courts can use certain 
technology to see whether republications of a defamatory deepfake are 
the same as the original video that it already deemed defamatory.226 
Even if courts choose to follow the current legal framework of 
injunctions under defamation law, very narrowly tailored injunctions—
such as the Type IV injunctions outline in Part V.C.—would likely be 
effective at removing offending material without disturbing protected 
speech. A court could craft an injunction such as the one below: 
Defendants are permanently enjoined from publishing the 
deepfake, (describe deepfake file name here), adjudged 
defamatory by this court, either in its entirety or in part on any 
public medium (including, but not limited to, the Internet, 
television, and/or radio). Publication in part shall include the 
publication of any frame, series of frames, and/or audio snippet(s) 
from (describe deepfake file name here).  
Such an injunction is broad enough to prevent further harm from 
the specific deepfake, while still being narrow enough to avoid censoring 
constitutionally protected speech. Given deepfakes’ special 
characteristics and risks, they serve as a unique example that some 
injunctions on defamatory speech may comport with the First 
Amendment. 
VIII. Injunctions and Third-Party Providers 
Even if an injunction against a deepfake is found to be 
constitutional, under the current statutory scheme only the creator can 
be held liable for not removing the offending content from the 
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Internet.227 Under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 
1996 (“CDA”),228 Internet service providers (“ISPs”) are not subject to 
civil liability for the content posted to their webpages by a third 
party.229 Congress adopted the CDA wake of the Stratton Oakmont v. 
Prodigy Services,230 where the Supreme Court of New York held that 
an interactive ISP that monitored its services should be considered a 
publisher of defamatory content, even though a third party posted the 
content on the ISP’s webpage.231 Congress feared that exposing ISPs to 
civil liability would discourage self-censorship. Thus, Congress provided 
immunity from civil liability to ISPs for content posted by third parties, 
even if the ISP monitors or modifies the content. 232  Courts have 
interpreted the CDA broadly, insulating “interactive computer 
services” from all civil liability (except copyright infringement) for 
content posted on their websites.233 
The blanket immunity provided to ISPs by CDA § 230 could pose 
a major issue for defamatory political deepfakes because many deepfake 
creators will likely be unreachable by the judicial system. Crafty 
deepfake creators may post their creations under fake usernames and 
leave an insufficient digital trail to be identified and brought to court. 
Also, a multitude of deepfake creators may reside outside the physical 
jurisdiction of the United States.234 Many legal commentators have 
addressed the issues of ISP immunity under the CDA § 230. 235 
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Deepfakes are merely another addition to a growing list of concerns 
created by blanket immunity to ISPs.236 
Because deepfakes create unique issues and threats, Congress 
should create an exception for them, similar to exception created for 
copyright infringements under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”).237 The DCMA provides ISPs with a “safe harbor” to limit 
ISPs’ liability for monetary damages for copyrighted materials hosted 
on their websites.238 ISPs can, however, be held in contempt for failing 
to comply with an injunction if they do not comply with several general 
requirements.239 ISPs “must adopt, implement, and inform users of a 
policy providing for the termination of repeat infringers.”240 In addition, 
ISPs must employ “standard technical measures” to detect copyrighted 
works.241 Most importantly for copyright holders, to be eligible for the 
“safe-harbor” protections, ISPs must, “upon notification of claimed 
infringement . . . respond[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access 
to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of 
infringing activity.”242 This provision is often referred to as “notice and 
takedown” procedure.243 
Extending the protections of the DMCA to cover defamatory 
deepfakes would significantly reduce their potential harm. Even if a 
political figure was unable to find the deepfake’s original creator, she 
could bring a defamation case against the unnamed creator. If political 
figure could prove that the video is a deepfake, and the court finds the 
video to be defamatory, the political figure could obtain a default 
judgment, including a permanent injunction (like the one described in 
Part VII). The political figure could then send a takedown notice to the 
ISP, backed by the full weight of judicial authority. 
Although such a process allows the defamatory video to be posted 
longer than any political figure would like, the process provides a 
multitude of other protections. First, many ISPs actively self-police, 
and upon notice that a political figure has filed a high-profile lawsuit 
alleging a video to be a deepfake, they would likely take down the video 
prior to any court proceedings either out of a sense of corporate 
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responsibility or for economic reasons.244 Even if the ISP does not self-
police, and the video is allowed to remain on the Internet throughout 
the duration of the suit, simply giving political figures the ability to sue 
allows them to signal that they are contesting the validity of a posted 
video. The political figures can then publicize their lawsuit, and an 
attentive press would likely report on that lawsuit. The political figure’s 
lawsuit has the secondary effect of warning the press to proceed with 
caution on their reporting of the video’s contents. 
Certainly, the DMCA process is not perfect,245 but it is the only 
time-tested process for dealing with individually policing and removing 
non-protected speech posted on the Internet. Due to ISPs’ familiarity 
with the DMCA, extending it to deepfakes should create only minimal 
additional costs for ISPs. Although deepfakes will become progressively 
easier to create, they will likely never be as pervasive as copyright 
infringement. Also because, at least for the time being, creating a 
deepfake leaves a digital trace, deepfakes should be easier for ISPs to 
detect than copyright infringements.246 Given the minimal additional 
cost on ISPs, extending the DMCA to defamatory deepfakes would be 
a cost effective way to deal with the serious threats they pose to society. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that defamatory political deepfakes could cause serious 
harms to individuals and society. Such harms, however, must be 
balanced against protecting freedom of speech under the First 
Amendment. Courts have rightfully been skeptical of restraints on 
expression, especially if they have the possibility of restricting protected 
speech. But in the case of deepfakes, courts have an opportunity to 
specifically define the form of expression that is defamatory. Courts also 
bear a far lower risk of misclassifying speech as defamatory because 
deepfakes are purposefully designed to be false. Thus, courts should 
draw lessons from both obscenity and copyright law to allow some 
narrowly crafted permanent injunctions against deepfakes. Such 
narrowly crafted injunctions will help prevent the spread of 
misinformation that might undermine elections or trust in public 
officials while providing the least restrictive means possible of limiting 
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expression. In addition, Congress should consider expanding the DMCA 
or other similar legislation to include defamatory deepfakes. Only 
through such action will political figures (and society, in general) have 
a legitimate judicial solution to the harms created by defamatory 
political deepfakes. 
Returning to this Note’s original hypothetical, if Trump had an 
opportunity to counter the defamatory deepfake through a judicial 
process that provided him with an equitable remedy to remove the 
offending content, then some of the video’s potential harms would be 
at least curbed, if not eliminated. Instead of simply denying the video’s 
truth, using the judicial process to counter and remove such content 
would bring more legitimacy to deepfake target’s denial, and 
consequently, to the political system in general. Such a hypothetical 
could happen to any political figure at any governmental level. As a 
society, regardless of our individual political beliefs, we need a more 
legitimate system for combating this kind of misinformation, especially 
when it comes in such a virulent form as a deepfake video. The judicial 
system, drawing on lessons learned regarding other types of limited 
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